The Ohio State University
Department of Political Science

Political Science 867: Game Theory and Politics

Fall 2005   Alan E. Wiseman
T, Th 9:30-11:18 (AM)   2186A Derby Hall
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This version of PS 867 is a course in applied game theory with the objective of preparing students for incorporating and understanding formal models in the fields of political economy and positive political science, regardless of substantive subfield. While the class is somewhat Americanist-focused, with a strong emphasis on legislative politics, the applications considered are sufficiently generalizable to be applied to many different areas in political science, and classroom discussion will focus on potential bridges between subfields.

While there is no formal prerequisite for this course, it is assumed that the student would have successfully completed Political Science 788 "Mathematical Theory of Politics" which is currently the introductory course in game theory offered by the Department. Completion of this course is not a requirement, but it is assumed that students entering this class have a solid grasp of fundamental concepts of game theory, such as strategy sets, reaction functions, Nash equilibrium, etc. Knowledge of basic calculus is also helpful. The course requirements will include several problem sets (at least four) and a final examination, administered in class. The examination will represent fifty percent of the course grade, the problem sets forty percent, and class discussion ten percent.

There are no required textbooks for the class, as the course will be primarily paper-driven, but the following books might be of interest (and aid) to class participants, and generally might prove useful to own as future reference sources. The reading list that follows is a tentative collection of papers that will be analyzed over the course of the quarter. The syllabus indicates what days each paper will be covered in class, and students are expected to read the assigned paper(s) prior to attending class on the days they will be analyzed.

Recommended Texts

Austen-Smith, David, and Jeffrey S. Banks. 1999. *Positive Political Theory I: Collective Preference*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Dixit, Avinash, and Susan Skeath. 2004. *Games of Strategy, 2nd Edition*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

Fundenberg, Drew, and Jean Tirole. 1991. *Game Theory*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Gibbons, Robert. 1992. *Game Theory for Applied Economists*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Grossman, Gene M., and Elhanan Helpman. 2001. *Special Interest Politics*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Mas-Colell, Andreu, Michael D. Whinston, and Jerry R. Green. 1995. *Microeconomic Theory*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Meirowitz, Adam, and Nolan McCarty. Forthcoming. *Political Game Theory*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Available at: http://www.princeton.edu/~nmccarty/Political_Game_Theory%20.pdf

Course Schedule and Reading List

September 22: Organizational Meeting

September 27: Models of Agenda Setting (I)

Romer, Thomas, and Howard Rosenthal. 1978. "Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas and the Status Quo." *Public Choice*. 33: 27-43.
Denzau, Arthur T., and Robert J. MacKay. 1983. ""Gate Keeping and Monopoly Power of Committees: An Analysis of Sincere and Sophisticated Behavior." *American Journal of Political Science*. 27 (4): 740-761.

September 29: Models of Agenda Setting (II) and Particularistic Legislative Bargaining (II)

Krehbiel, Keith 1996. "Institutional and Partisan Sources of Gridlock: A Theory of Divided and Unified Government." *Journal of Theoretical Politics*. 8: 7-40.

Baron, D. P. and J. A. Ferejohn. 1989. "Bargaining in Legislatures." *American Political Science Review*. 83 (December): 1181-1206.

October 4: Models of Particularistic Legislative Bargaining (II)

Review Baron and Ferejohn (1989)

October 6: Models of Particularistic Bargaining with Taxation

Baron, David P. 1991. "Majoritarian Incentives, Pork Barrel Programs, and Procedural Control." *American Journal of Political Science*. 34: 57-90.

October 11: Models of Collective Good Provision

Baron, David P. 1996. "A Dynamic Theory of Legislative Choice." *American Political Science Review*. 90 (June): 316-330.

October 13: Models of Particularistic and Collective Bargaining

Volden, Craig, and Alan E. Wiseman. 2005. "Bargaining in Legislatures over Collective and Particularistic Goods." Unpublished Manuscript, The Ohio State University.

October 18: Models of Lobbying (I)

Snyder, James M., Jr. 1991. "On Buying Legislatures." *Economics and Politics*. 3: 93-109.

October 20: Models of Lobbying (II)

Groseclose, Tim and James M. Snyder. 1996. "Buying Supermajorities." *American Political Science Review*. 90 (June): 303-315.

October 25: Models of Parliamentary Bargaining (I)

Baron, David P. 1998. "Comparative Dynamics of Parliamentary Governments." *American Political Science Review*. 92 (3): 593-610.

October 27: Models of Parliamentary Bargaining (II)

Review Baron (1998)

November 1: Models of Parliamentary Logrolling

Carrubba, Clifford J., and Craig Volden. 2001. "Explaining Institutional Change in the European Union: What Determines the Voting Rule in the Council of Ministers?" *European Union Politics*. 2(1): 5-30.

November 3: Models of Parliamentary Elections and Lawmaking

Austen-Smith, David, and J. Banks. 1988. "Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes." *American Political Science Review*. 82 (June): 405-422.

November 8: Models of Information Transmission in Legislatures (I)

Gilligan, T., and K. Krehbiel. 1987. "Collective Decision-Making and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures." *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*. 3: 287-335.

November 10: Models of Information Transmission in Legislatures (II)

Review Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987)

November 15: Models of Information Transmission in Bureaucracies

Banks, J.S. 1989. "Agency Budgets, Cost Information, and Auditing." *American Journal of Political Science*. 33: 670-99.

November 17: Models of Information Transmission in Group Settings

Austen-Smith, David and Jeffrey Banks. 1996. "Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem." *American Political Science Review*. 90 (1): 34-45.

November 22: Models of Parties and Elections (I)

Snyder, James M., Jr., and Michael M. Ting. 2002. "An Informational Rationale for Political Parties." *American Journal of Political Science*. 46 (1): 90-110.

November 24: Thanksgiving—No Class

November 29: Models of Parties and Elections (II)

Wiseman, Alan E. Forthcoming. "A Theory of Partisan Support and Entry Deterrence in Electoral Competition." *Journal of Theoretical Politics*.

December 1: Review, Catchup, Conclusion