

## PS 759

### International Organization

The course raises the question of the existence and significance of international institutions broadly defined as to include law, treaties, and international organizations. Drawing from political economy, we will ponder what the specific reasons are for why anarchy fails to deliver an efficient allocation of resources and what *specific* institutional solutions have been, or could be, invoked or devised to remedy each type of failure. We will also devote a few sections to new trends in the study of international institutions.

The course requires no prior knowledge of game theory or statistical modeling.

It will be run in the form of a seminar. A set of readings will be assigned each time, with each participant being expected to present and comment on those readings. The class will be sanctioned by a seminar paper, a five-to-ten-page-long paper to be outlined in the last sitting and handed in by the official deadline.

*Abbreviations:* *IO*: International Organization. *ISQ*: International Studies Quarterly. *APSR*: American Political Science Review. *AJPS*: American Journal of Political Science.

#### 1. Paradigmatic change: From transaction costs to institutional design

Keohane, Robert O. 1984. *After Hegemony*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chap. 6

Lake, David A. 1996. Anarchy, hierarchy and the variety of international relations. *IO* 50,1:1-33.

Koremenos, Barbara, Duncan Snidal and Charles Lipson. 2001. The rational design of international institutions. *IO* 55,4:761-800.

Gilligan, Michael J. 2009. The transactions costs approach to understanding international institutions. In Helen V. Milner and Andrew Moravcsik. *Power, Interdependence and Non-State Actors in World Politics: Research Frontiers*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

<http://politics.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/2601/TransactionsCostsApproach.pdf>

### Classic solutions to classic problems

#### 2. Zero-sum conflict

Waltz, Kenneth N. 1981. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better. *Adelphi Papers* 171. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Fearon, James D. 1995. Rationalist explanations for war. *IO* 49:379-414.

(read Waltz and Fearon as disquisitions on why and when international institutions are unnecessary.)

Grieco, Joseph M. 1988. Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation - A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism. *IO* 42,3:485-507.

Krasner, Stephen D. 1991. "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier." *World Politics* 43,3:336-366.

*Optional:* Fearon, James D. 1998. Bargaining, enforcement, and international cooperation. *IO* 52:269-305. (reinforces Krasner's point that bargaining is more important than enforcement)

Kupchan, Charles A., Clifford A. Kupchan. 1995. The Promise of collective security. *International Security* 20,1:52-61 (balancing of all against one mitigates risk of war caused by distributive ambition)

Mitchell, Ronald B. and Patricia Keilbach. 2001. Situation structure and institutional design: Reciprocity, coercion, and exchange. *IO* 55, 4 (Issue linkage and side-payment as solutions to asymmetric distributive problems)

### 3. Participation and free riding (the collective action problem)

- Olson, Mancur and Richard Zeckhauser. 1966. An economic theory of alliances. *Review of Economics and Statistics* 48,3:266-79.
- Stein, Arthur A. 1982. Coordination and collaboration regimes in an anarchic world. *IO* 36:299-324.
- Optional:* Snidal, Duncan. 1985. Coordination versus Prisoners' Dilemma: Implications for international cooperation and regimes. *APSR* 79:923-42.
- Barrett, Scott. 2003. *Environment and Statecraft*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapter 7 (simple participation game)
- Kolliker, Alkuin. 2005. Globalization and national incentives for protecting environmental goods: Types of goods, trade effects and international collective action problems. In Frank Wijen, Kees Zoeteman, Jan Pieters (eds.), *A Handbook of Globalisation and Environmental Policy: National Government Interventions in a Global Arena*, pp.53-85 (all kinds of goods)
- Heal, Geoffrey. 1999. New strategies for the provision of global public goods: Learning from international environmental challenges. In *Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21<sup>ST</sup> Century*, edited Inge Paul, Isabelle Grunberg, and Marc A. Stern, pp. 220-39. United Nations Development Program. New York: Oxford University Press (privatizing public goods)
- Thompson, Alexander and Daniel Verdier. 2012. Multilateralism, bilateralism and regime design. Unpublished manuscript (bilateralism and side-payments to the rescue)

### 4. Cheating enabled by unobservable action (the moral hazard problem)

- Chayes, Abram and Antonia Handler Chayes. 1993. On compliance. *IO* 47,2:174-206.
- Mitchell, Ronald B. 1994. Regime design matters: Intentional oil pollution and treaty compliance. *IO* 48,3:425-58
- Downs, George, David M. Rocke and Peter N. Barsoom. 1996. Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation? *IO* 50, 3:
- Bailey, Michael, Judith Goldstein, and Barry Weingast. 1997. The institutional roots of American trade policy: politics, coalitions, and international trade. *World Politics* 49, 3:309-38
- Dai, Xinyuan. 2005. Why comply? The domestic constituency mechanism. *IO* 59, 2: 363-98
- Optional:* Gilligan, Michael J. 2006. Is enforcement necessary for effectiveness? A model of the International Criminal Regime. *IO* 60,4:935-68.

### 5. Time inconsistency (the credible commitment problem)

- Bordo, Michael D. and Finn E. Kydland. 1995. "The Gold Standard as a rule: An essay in exploration." *Explorations in Economic History* 32: 423-464.
- Simmons, Beth A. 2000. "International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs." *APSR* 94, 4: 819-35.
- Moravcsik, Andrew. 2000. The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe." *IO* 54,2:217-52.
- Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, Mette and Daniel Verdier. 2005. "European integration as a solution to war." *European Journal of International Relations* 11,1:99-135.

### 6. Private information about intentions (the adverse selection problem)

- Kydd, Andrew. 2001. "Trust Building, Trust Breaking: The Dilemma of NATO Enlargement." *International Organization* 55, 4
- Schultz, Kenneth A. 2003. Tying hands and washing hands: The US Congress and multilateral humanitarian intervention." In *Locating the proper authorities: the interaction of domestic and international institutions*, edited by D. Drezner, pp. 105-142. U. of Michigan Press.
- Von Stein, Jana. 2005. "Do treaties constrain or screen? Selection bias and treaty compliance." *APSR* 99, 4: 611-622 (a response to Simmons 2000)
- Thompson, Alex. 2006. "Coercion through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission." *IO* 60,1 :1-34.

- Milner, Helen. 2006. "Why multilateralism? Foreign aid and domestic principal-agent problems." In Darren G. Hawkins et al. *Delegation and Agency in International Organization*. Cambridge University Press. 107-139
- Gray, Julia. 2009. International organization as a seal of approval. *AJPS* 53,4:931-49.

## 7. Uncertain future

- Already read:* Bordo, Michael D. and Finn E. Kydland. 1995. "The Gold Standard as a rule: An essay in exploration." *Explorations in Economic History* 32: 423-464.
- Downs, George W. and David M. Rocke 1995. *Optimal Imperfection*. Chapter 4. Princeton University Press.
- Rosendorff, B. Peter and Helen V. Milner. 2001. The optimal design of international trade institutions: Uncertainty and escape. *IO* 55, 4: 829-57.
- Optional:* Rosendorff, B. Peter. 2005. Stability and rigidity: Politics and design of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Procedure. *APSR* 99,3:389-400 (formal model)
- Koremenos, Barbara. 2005. "Contracting around International Uncertainty," *APSR* 99,4: 549-65
- Kicik, Jeffrey, and Eric Reinhardt. 2008. Does flexibility promote cooperation? An application to the global trade regime. *IO* 62,3:477-505 (interesting econometric treatment)
- Pelc, Krzysztof J. 2009. Seeking escape: The use of escape clauses in international trade agreements. *ISQ* 53:349-68. (two versions of enforcing escape clauses)
- Optional:* Johns, Leslie. 2011. Depth versus rigidity in the design of international trade agreements. unpublished manuscript (formal model)

## 8. Belief diversity (the common knowledge problem)

- Haas, Peter M. 1992. Banning chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic community efforts to protect stratospheric ozone. *IO* 46,1:187-224.
- Finnemore, Martha. 1993. International organizations as teachers of norms. *IO* 47,4:565-99 (sociology approach)
- Optional:* Iida, Keisuke. 1993. Analytic uncertainty and international cooperation: Theory and application to international economic policy coordination. *ISQ* 37,4:431-57 (game theoretic approach)
- Johnston, Iain. 2003. "Security Council deliberations: The power of the better argument." *European Journal of International Relations* 14, 3:437-80.
- Kelley, Judith. 2004. International actors on the domestic scene: Membership conditionality and socialization by international institutions. *IO* 58,3:425-57.
- Mitzen, Jennifer. 2005. "Reading Habermas in anarchy: Multilateral diplomacy and global public spheres." *APSR* 99, 3: 401-417.

# New trends

## 9. Informal Governance

- Lipson, Charles. 1991. Why are some international agreements Informal? *IO* 45, 4: 495-538.
- Abbott, Kenneth W. and Duncan Snidal. 2000. Hard and soft law in international governance. *IO* 54,3:421-456.

### **SELF-ENFORCED (NO ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS)**

- Already read:* Dai, Xinyuan. 2005. Why comply? The domestic constituency mechanism. *IO* 59, 2: 363-98
- Already opted:* Gilligan, Michael J. 2006. Is enforcement necessary for effectiveness? A model of the International Criminal Regime. *IO* 60,4:935-68.

### **SELF-COMMITTAL (NO LEGAL COMMITMENT): TRANSGOVERNMENTAL NETWORKS**

- Optional:* Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye. 1974. Transgovernmental relations and international organizations. *World Politics* 27, 1: 39-62.

Raustiala, Kal. 2002-2003. The Architecture of international cooperation: Transgovernmental networks and the future of international law. *Virginia Journal of international Law* 43, 2: 2-92.

**NONGOVERNMENTAL (NO GOVERNMENT): PRIVATE GOVERNANCE**

Vogel, David. 2009. The Private Regulation of Global Corporate Conduct. In *The Politics of Global Regulation*, edited by Walter Mattli and Ngaire Woods, pp. 151-188. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

*Optional:*

Bernstein, Steven and Benjamin Cashore. 2004. Non-State Global Governance: Is Forest Certification a Legitimate Alternative to as Global Forest Convention? In *Hard Choices, Soft Law: Voluntary standards in global trade, environment and social governance*, edited by John K. Kirton and Michael J. Trebilcock, pp. 33-63: Aldershot: Ashgate.

Haufler, Virginia. 2010. The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme: An innovation in global governance and conflict prevention." *Journal of Business Ethics* 89:403-416.

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**10. Fragmentation, Complexity, Forum Shopping**

Busch, Marc L. 2007. Overlapping institutions, forum shopping, and dispute settlement in international trade. *IO* 61,4:735-62.

Benvenisti, Eyal, and George W. Downs. 2007. The empire's new clothes: Political economy and the fragmentation of international law. *Stanford Law Review* 60:595-631.

Alter, Karen J. and Sophie Meunier. 2009. The politics of international regime complexity. *Perspectives on Politics* 7,1:13-24.

Keohane, Robert O. and David G Victor. 2011. The regime complex for climate change. *Perspectives on Politics* 9,1:7-23.