Michael J. Reese - Dissertation

THE FEAR OF THE POWERFUL: DEMOCRACY, AUTHORITARIANISM, AND
THE VIOLENT ESCALATION OF ASYMMETRIC CRISES

By

Michael J. Reese, Ph.D.

The Ohio State University, 2009

Committee:

Professor Randall L. Schweller, Adviser

Professor Richard K. Herrmann

Assistant Professor Bear F. Braumoeller

Abstract:

Like many theories of international relations, explanations of crisis escalation frequently invoke uncertainty as a critical factor. However, scholars largely fail to consider the implications of certainty in crisis. In asymmetric crises, actors are presented with certainty of knowledge in the power balance. According to the standard realist account, this certainty should reduce miscalculation and prevent most asymmetric crises from escalating to a violent stage. Nevertheless, I find that this certainty does not influence crisis escalation in the predictable ways implied by realism: asymmetric crises end violently just as often as symmetric ones.

In pursuit of an answer to this intriguing puzzle, I formulate a “regime-based model of asymmetric crisis escalation.” The model hypothesizes that the presence of democratic political institutions on the stronger side provides incentives for leaders to behave intransigently in crisis bargaining scenarios. Meanwhile, the leaders on the weaker side view democracy in their stronger opponents as a point of leverage rendering them vulnerable to exploitation in crisis bargaining. With both sides misperceiving the incentives before their adversary, the result is frequent bargaining deadlock and violent escalation.

This expectation is tested statistically on a sample of 77 asymmetric crises drawn from the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) project. I find that asymmetric crises with powerful democratic sides are more likely to end in violence than those with powerful authoritarian sides. The predictive power of my model is dramatic. Over 70% of the time, my model correctly predicts whether a case will end violently or peacefully. I then explore the validity of my theory in 4 qualitative case studies of asymmetric crisis drawn from the larger sample of 77. In the process, I demonstrate the ability of my regime-based explanation to shed light on the historical events of the Anschluss Crisis of 1938, the Suez Crisis of 1951, the Iran Hostage Crisis of 1979, and the U-137 Crisis of 1981.

My dissertation therefore represents a powerful and robust explanation for the violent escalation of asymmetric crises. This research not only contributes to the academic understanding of international conflict, but it also provides useful predictions and information to practicing decisionmakers.

Excerpt:

CHAPTER 1 - Introduction: Why Do Asymmetric Crises Escalate?