

**The Detail in the Devils:
A New Empirical Conceptualization of Authoritarianism**

M. J. Reese

The Ohio State University

Paper prepared for the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, August 31st – September 3rd 2006

PLEASE DO NOT CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION

COMMENTS WELCOME

e-mail: reese.150@osu.edu

Abstract

The literature on the relationship between a state's regime type and its propensity to engage in violent conflict is one of the most extensive in the study of international relations. The most significant of these efforts revolves around the empirical phenomenon known as the democratic peace – the fact that regimes that incorporate regular electoral competition will rarely, if ever, engage in violent conflict with one another. Reiter and Tillman (2002) note, however, that the Polity data usually employed to study the democratic peace fails to capture key variation that can be found when “democracy” is unpacked into a finer level of conceptual detail. Similarly, Lai & Slater (2006) among others find that unpacking the concept of authoritarianism reveals key variance within that class of regimes as well. Following in this spirit, I present an argument in favor of what I have dubbed the Authoritarian Instability Project (AIP) – a quantitatively oriented dataset concentrating upon the concept of authoritarian instability, or the vulnerability of an authoritarian regime to overthrow. To pursue this concept empirically, I introduce five key dimensions of authoritarian instability: the regime's tenure in control of its society, the openness of regime recruitment, the regime's political ideology, the autonomy of the military from the regime, and the regime's organizational domination of its civil society. I then describe three ordinal values a given authoritarian regime may register on each dimension. I also present a tentative overview of how the AIP data will be coded and structured. I then conclude with some thoughts on the great potential a dataset on authoritarian instability might hold for the theoretical study of state behavior and its potential utility to policymakers.

The American mission in Iraq has seen its fair share of twists and turns. Originally, the United States claimed that Saddam Hussein presented a clear and present danger to the world by virtue of his pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. In the aftermath of the invasion to topple his Ba'athist authoritarian regime, it became clear that hard evidence of these weapons was not going to be found. In an effort to take a lemon and make lemonade, as it were, the Bush administration changed tactics. Operation Iraqi Freedom has now been legitimated as a worthy effort to advance the cause of democratic change in a notoriously authoritarian region. Specifically, this effort will remake one of the world's most conflictual authoritarian states of the last quarter century into a peaceful democratic one. However, the last few months have placed these optimistic hopes in jeopardy. While Iraq has now acquired the many of the institutional trappings of a democratic state, one increasingly possible future for the embattled country is a relapse into some form of authoritarianism predicated on the dominance of the previously suppressed Shia majority. An authoritarian resurgence of the Sunnis, the ethnic group at the core of the overthrown Ba'athist regime, is also entirely plausible. If one of these dreaded outcomes were to occur, would the resulting authoritarian regime likely be more peaceful towards its neighbors than the old? Or would it, on the other hand, be more violent than its predecessor? While there are many extant schemes for coding authoritarian regimes in American political science, there have been few detailed enough to capture the potential differences between what might appear, at first glance, to be very similar non-democratic regimes. I argue that a renewed Sunni-based or Shia-based authoritarian regime in Iraq would likely be less stable than the deposed Ba'athist regime and would therefore likely be even more conflictual with its neighbors. In this paper, I present an argument in favor of what I have dubbed the Authoritarian Instability Project (AIP). The AIP, currently in the developmental stage, will produce a quantitatively

oriented dataset with the potential to shed light on these and other questions that hinge on the subtle “detail in the devils.”

This paper will proceed in four sections. In the first, I will review some of the most commonly used schemes for delineating authoritarian regime types. I argue that, while useful to a degree, these current datasets are not fine-grained enough to pick up important variations within the set of authoritarian states – variations that have the potential to carry significant additional explanatory weight. In the second section, I outline the conceptual foundations of the AIP and introduce five primary dimensions of authoritarian instability. In the third section, I briefly sketch the envisaged structure of the AIP data itself. In the final section, I conclude with some thoughts on the potential of the AIP to shed light on questions of international conflict as well as its capability to further other theoretical and practical endeavors.

Why another Regime-Type Dataset? The Limitations of Extant Schemes

More than any other research problem in political science, the quantitative classification of political regimes was driven by research into the phenomenon known as the “democratic peace” (e.g. Morgan and Campbell 1991; Maoz and Russett 1993; Dixon 1994; Raymond 1994; Mousseau 1998; Oneal and Russett 1999; Russett and Oneal 2001). The democratic peace research program is premised on the expectation that the constraints on government action provided by regular electoral contestation would limit their propensity to engage in military conflict. To explore this hypothesis in a rigorous empirical manner, this research has almost exclusively employed the regime coding data of the Polity project in its various versions (e.g.

Jagers and Gurr 1995). The Polity data, which codes regimes with a “Polity Score” of +10 (strong democracy) to -10 (strong autocracy), has been used to verify many of the central tenets of the democratic peace hypothesis. The most consistent conclusion reached by these studies is that democratic dyads are substantially more peaceful than mixed or autocratic dyads (e.g. Maoz and Russett 1993). The success of the Polity data in this and other research endeavors has, by and large, elevated the project to “gold standard” status within the field as a definitive source of regime-type classifications.

While not discounting the interesting empirical conclusions reached through the use of the Polity data, recent research has cast doubt upon the efficiency of the “Polity Score” as a predictor of democratic state behavior. Reiter and Tillman (2002) go beyond the Polity data in an effort to describe differences in conflict behavior within the set of democratic states. They find that by deconstructing the concept of democracy into various theoretical components drawn from research in comparative politics and international relations – such as the number of effective political parties (e.g. Laakso & Taagepera 1979) & presidential vs. parliamentary system behavior (e.g. Elman 2000) – results in the discovery of interesting variance in the conflict behavior of different types of democracy. Most significantly, Reiter and Tillman find that higher voter participation rates in elections serve as an effective predictor of which democracies will, on average, behave more peacefully. This is but one example of research that finds the Polity data, while useful in the empirical comparison of democratic regimes with non-democratic regimes, loses some of its veracity if one wishes to study variations within each of these subsets.

The central finding of the democratic peace research program – that democracies will be peaceful towards one another – has spawned efforts to explore whether there might be a comparable “dictatorial peace” between non-democratic states. Investigations employing the

Polity data have found little evidence of such a phenomenon (e.g. Russett & Oneal 2001). The problem may lie with the fact that autocracy, especially in the Polity data, tends to be defined against the standards of liberal democracy. In other words, what Polity calls “autocracy” (a direct analogue for what I call “authoritarianism”) is in actuality nothing more than a residual category where states that do not measure up to the fairly rigorous standards of liberal democracy end up getting pigeonholed. While some venerable works in the study of comparative politics have cogently argued that non-democratic regimes share important theoretically significant characteristics (e.g. Stepan 1988; Linz 2000), they carefully bound their observations with important qualifiers (i.e. military regimes for Stepan, totalitarian regimes for Linz, etc.). These qualifiers almost never include a regime’s distance from the liberal democratic ideal of Polity. As a result, scholars of authoritarian regimes rarely rely on Polity scores for identifying sets of comparable regimes.

The usual comparative approach to differentiating authoritarian regimes is to devise a typology of ideal-types to use as a standard of comparison. Regimes can therefore be categorized and studied by virtue of their similarity to one of these formulations. One commonly employed comparative standard divides authoritarian regimes into three predominant archetypes based upon their institutional locus of power: “one-party,” “military,” and “personalistic” regimes (e.g. Geddes 1999). Peceny et al. (2002) present a compelling case that the application of this typology scheme in quantitative analysis yields a statistically identifiable peace between “one-party” authoritarian regimes, but weak evidence of a peace in any other dyadic combination.

Critiques of both the Polity-based democratic peace approach and the comparative politics typology approach to classifying authoritarian regimes have found that both schemes fail to capture substantive variations in conflict behavior. Recent scholarship on regime type has

promoted the concept of a “selectorate” that may serve as a generalizable characterization of both authoritarian and democratic regimes (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). A selectorate is defined as the set of individuals in a society that possess the right to approve or disapprove of a political actor’s assumption or maintenance of political power. According to the selectorate framework, while authoritarian regimes have a comparatively small selectorate in common, variations in just how small the selectorate is may significantly impact state behavior. This basic premise has been used to discover variations in authoritarian tendencies to initiate and escalate militarized interstate disputes (Danilovic and Clare 2004). Yet another approach to studying these tendencies towards belligerence concentrates upon the relative capacity between “one-party” and other types of authoritarian regime to mobilize and control their populations. Lai and Slater (2006) find that military regimes, because of their lack of notable political options outside of the violent suppression of internal dissent, are more likely to engage in interstate conflict.

While all of the previously cited approaches to studying authoritarian regimes have had their successes, I seek to compliment these existing findings with yet another framework that focuses upon the stability of authoritarian regimes. In this, I am primarily taking the Lai and Slater (2006) “regime stability” approach as my starting point. Lai and Slater’s theoretical argument is a variation on the idea that unstable regimes – or regimes facing a significant threat of being overthrown – will tend to be more conflictual than stable regimes. Previous examples of this argument cited by Lai and Slater (e.g. Miller 1995; Snyder 2000; Mansfield and Snyder 2002) contend that authoritarian regimes, as a group, are *all* inherently unstable and therefore more likely to be conflictual. Lai and Slater themselves find, on the other hand, that only authoritarian regimes that cannot rely on a political party to assist in societal control meet this instability condition. While accepting Lai & Slater’s conclusions, I contend that they have not

uncovered the whole story. I argue that some non-party authoritarian regimes hold the potential to be more unstable than others. Similarly, I argue that some one-party regimes may not be as stable as others. Unfortunately, with existing data sources it is impossible to explore these alternative hypotheses.

The AIP data collection effort would seek to delve into these potential sources of authoritarian regime instability. Through the creation of a specifically-designed set of empirical data on non-democratic regimes, not only would research into inter-state conflict be advanced, but the potential exists to further the study other related theoretical problems such as democratization, economic reform, and ethnic conflict to name just a few examples. The AIP is not intended to fully replace or subsume earlier research efforts. Rather, it is intended to explore their findings at an even finer level of empirical detail.

The Authoritarian Instability Project: Conceptual Foundations

The AIP project focuses upon the concept of “authoritarian instability.” By instability, I am referring to the challenges an authoritarian regime faces in its bid to continue to hold political power over its civil society. As such, I am concerned with the domestic sources of potential regime changes; issues related to externally-imposed regime changes fall outside of the scope of my project. By regime change, I refer both to changes toward a democratic system (the primary concern of the democratization literature) and toward an alternative authoritarian system (a subject that has not received substantial attention). The domestic enemies of any authoritarian regime are potentially numerous. Authoritarian leaders must exist in a constant state of tension

over whether their regime will be overthrown by one of, or some combination of, these enemies. I therefore adopt the common assumption that political leaders are primarily motivated by a desire to hold onto political power and will make their decisions with that objective clearly in mind (e.g. Downs 1957). However, authoritarian leaders are not subject to losing their power in the same predictable and controlled fashion as democratic leaders. Rather, an authoritarian politician must constantly be on guard against the threats posed by violent rebellions, revolutions, and coup d'etats. The AIP would be dedicated to cataloguing the likely intensity of this "instability" in each authoritarian regime on a year by year basis.

The focus of the AIP is on five dimensions of authoritarian instability. This list of dimensions remains preliminary and open to revision. Partial credit for these dimensional concepts must go to Jagers and Gurr (1995), as several of are modified versions of dimensions found in the Polity project. For the most part, however, these dimensions represent a collection of concepts drawn from different research programs within the field of comparative politics. The goal was not to capture every dimension along which authoritarian regimes might vary, but the most important ones for understanding a regime's vulnerability.

The five component dimensions of the AIP are: 1) the regime's tenure in control of its society, 2) the openness of regime recruitment, 3) the regime's political ideology, 4) the autonomy of the military from the regime, and 5) the regime's organizational domination of its civil society. Each of these five dimensions are considered to be theoretically and empirically independent from one another. In other words, conceptually, an authoritarian regime could vary on one dimension of instability without a necessary corresponding covariation on another dimension. However, high readings on one dimension of instability are expected to reinforce and potentially amplify the effects of high readings on the other dimensions. In this portion of the

paper, I will outline each of the five AIP dimensions in more detail and describe the three ordinal values a regime could potentially register on each dimension.

Regime Tenure

The first dimension of the AIP is an indicator of how deeply the authoritarian regime's mechanism of succession has been institutionalized. I approach this issue by examining a regime's "tenure in control." This dimension is operationalized by observing the number of peaceful chief executive leadership transfers there have been in a given authoritarian state. The essential logic of this dimension is quite simple: the more deeply a mechanism for succession to power has been established, the more likely that mechanism will be relied upon in the future. In other words, authoritarian regimes that have established known political "rules of the game" are more likely to continue surviving into the future. Conversely, regimes that are comparatively young and have not established a set of succession guidelines are more likely to experience instability and rebellion.

The mechanism of political succession lies at the very heart of the concept of "regime type" as it is understood in modern American political science. Indeed, one of the primary virtues of democracy is that it charts a transparent path to power for all potential political participants. One of the most stabilizing influences of democracy is the knowledge held by ambitious individuals that, despite their lack of political influence at any particular moment, future elections may allow them an opportunity to gain power. Democratic majority rule is made possible by the implicit assumption that future elections will be allowed to render verdicts on current policy (Karl & Schmitter 1991). Democracy, by providing a roadmap to future political power, obviates the need for an opposition movement to overthrow the government by force due

to a lack of other political options. Authoritarian regimes, while generally lacking the clear and manifestly legitimate procedures present in a democracy, are capable of generating mechanisms that are functionally similar if not exact equivalents.

The specific mechanism of succession in an authoritarian regime can be difficult to identify. Indeed, authoritarianism itself is defined by its absence of fully transparent methods of succession. However, several types of non-democratic succession procedure can be identified. In one-party states, there is frequently a chain-of-command whereby a designated lesser official inherits the power of a departing superior. Other authoritarian states employ some form of dynastic succession (a la the North Korean Kim dynasty or the system that would have likely emerged in Ba'athist Iraq). Still others might hold some form of oligarchic "election" where leaders are selected from and by very small central cadres of officials (a highly constrained "selectorate" in Bueno de Mesquita et al.'s terminology). In any event, a clear plan of political succession lends stability to any authoritarian regime. While obviously not democratic, it illustrates a potential path to power for the sufficiently ambitious and promotes confidence in the continuity of policy and administration for the rank-and-file membership of the bureaucratic and political infrastructure.

I operationalize authoritarian regime tenure via an adaptation of Samuel Huntington's "two-turnover" test as applied to democracies (Huntington 1993). Huntington cogently argues that a democracy can be considered sufficiently institutionalized when two changes, or turnovers, of executive political leadership have occurred. This establishes that at least two consecutive political leaders have accepted the rules of the succession system as legitimate and followed them accordingly. I adopt an analogous system for the AIP. I divide authoritarian regimes into three categories: 1) those that have experienced two or more turnovers in leadership, 2) those that

have experienced one political turnover, and 3) those that have experienced no such turnovers. It is expected that those regimes that have had more turnovers will experience more stability than those that have experienced fewer.

Authoritarian regimes that have experienced “two or more turnovers” in leadership can be considered relatively institutionalized and established. Such regimes can draw on a deep well of procedural legitimacy. This legitimacy is rooted in the fact that clear rules for attaining political power have been established and employed. In such situations, resistance and opposition against the regime will be more difficult to contemplate: a regime will have attained a certain degree of political inertia that becomes increasingly difficult to overcome the longer its rule is maintained. Moreover, ambitious would-be politicians have a clear path to power charted for them. Their incentive to engage in attempts to seize power violently is therefore reduced. Authoritarian regimes that develop a well-established mechanism for succession can therefore be considered the most stable.

An authoritarian state that has experienced a “single turnover” in leadership has proven that the regime is more than the idiosyncratic consequence of a single generation of political leaders. However, a single turnover is insufficient to confidently institutionalize a set of succession criteria. The first turnover of power is nevertheless an important step: it establishes that the regime has become institutionalized to the point that it can peaceably replace its own leadership without political violence or conflict. This communicates both to its own people and to the outside world that the regime does not rely on the charismatic leadership provided by the founding generation of leaders and is capable of governing a society over the long haul. The turnover also establishes a precedent for future power transfers. However, such single-turnover governments cannot be considered as stable as regimes that have had two turnovers because

there remains the possibility that a given turnover was a one-shot process that might, or might not be, repeated in the future. So, although more stable than first-generation authoritarian regimes, second-generation authoritarian states do not enjoy the full benefits of institutionalization enjoyed by even older regimes.

Finally, authoritarian regimes that are still run by their founding generation of leaders are expected to be the least stable, comparatively speaking, over the long run. These regimes are operated by leaders who themselves seized political power through the use of force which therefore makes them “no turnover” authoritarian states. Such revolutionary regimes may indeed enjoy tremendous support both initially and during the entire course of their tenure. However, such regimes must coexist with the tensions generated by the need to establish a succession procedure and the danger of potential counterrevolution. Frequently, these young authoritarian regimes will house several competing potential successors to the current leadership and a system for mediating these rival claims to power must be devised. If a mutually accepted succession mechanism cannot be found – a vexing problem absent the transparent procedures of democracy – the risk of a coup or civil war increases. The establishment of a mechanism of succession is also risky for the current generation of leaders: their would-be successors might become too eager to employ it before the current leaders are ready to part with their power. In short, an authoritarian regime in its earliest stages faces many of the same difficulties and uncertainties as those faced by a young democracy. It can therefore be considered the least-stable form of authoritarian regime as measured by this dimension.

In sum, an authoritarian regime can be considered analogous to democratic regimes in at least one important aspect: the longer the regime continues to peacefully regenerate itself, the longer it is likely to keep doing so. An established authoritarian regime possesses procedures for

succession that, while not necessarily open to all potential candidates, lends a certain degree of rational-legal legitimacy, to borrow a Weberian term, to its political processes. To be clear, this is not to argue that an institutionalized authoritarian regime can enjoy the same stability enjoyed by an institutionalized democratic regime. Nevertheless, the tenure dimension can capture meaningful variation within the set of authoritarian states.

Openness of Political Recruitment

The “openness of recruitment” dimension reflects the opportunity offered to talented citizens of an authoritarian state to enter into and participate in politics. The basic logic of this second dimension of authoritarian instability is that the more restricted and arbitrary the requirements are for joining a regime’s political apparatus, the more unstable the regime will be in the long run. The three values a regime could register on this dimension are: 1) “meritocratic,” 2) “restricted,” and 3) “personalistic.” The more a regime accepts talent from society by virtue of merit, the more stable it can be expected to be. The more personalistic its recruitment criteria, the less stable it will be.

The important function of political recruitment has implications not just for the day-to-day operation of a state in the near-term, but also for its stability and success in the long-term. A regime recruits lower entry-level officials to perform basic nut-and-bolt administrative functions but it is also, at the same time, selecting individuals who will rise through the ranks to become political leaders in the future. This ordered process of political incorporation is crucial in modern mass politics (Huntington 1968). Authoritarian regimes face a dilemma in political recruitment not faced by democratic societies: officials should ideally be selected by virtue of their competence...but this risks internal rebellion in the short-term if they are not loyal to the regime.

However, the temptation to bias recruitment in favor of politically loyal individuals over competent ones sows the seeds of long-term instability. While politically-vetted appointees and recruits will undoubtedly support the regime in their new positions, their inefficiency at providing basic governmental services will undermine the long-term legitimacy of the regime. A non-democratic regime relies heavily on its ability to provide substantive benefits to its populace thereby minimizing discord and dissent. A political crony machine is unlikely to produce sufficient benefits to allay this potential source of discontent. A recent study of Japan's bureaucracy finds superior policy in eras where meritocratic recruitment dominated compared with eras which saw the practice of more personalistic recruitment (Fukai and Fukai 1992).

A "meritocratic" authoritarian regime recruits members from its populace with little to no political restrictions on the individuals who will be accepted. This is not to say a meritocratic regime will not have *any* political litmus test for potential new members – however, such limitations should be relatively easy for any qualified member of an authoritarian society to overcome. For instance, while the Soviet Union required its political recruits to become members of the Communist party and express an allegiance to Marxist ideals, it was relatively easy for an ambitious or talented Soviet citizen regardless of nationality or political connection to meet this criterion. Meritocratic regimes place an emphasis on a recruit's ability to perform needed functions and these standards promote more effective state policy. Therefore, meritocratic authoritarian regimes can be expected to be more stable in the long run.

Some authoritarian regimes place restrictions on potential applicants that have little to nothing to do with their basic competence as political administrators and leaders. Regimes that constrain their recruits thusly are therefore likely to unnecessarily sacrifice valuable talent. Such regimes are termed "restricted recruitment" authoritarian states. Restricted recruitment regimes

frequently outlaw specific ethnic or national categories from holding political positions. Some regimes bias their recruitment in favor of individuals who matriculated from particular selective universities or learning institutions. Another possibility is that a potential political recruit could be ruled ineligible due to their familial connections with known dissidents or their personal histories with “unacceptable” political factions. Regimes that place blanket restrictions on candidates for recruitment that have little or nothing to do with competence, and that are impossible for reasonably qualified candidates to overcome, will generate less talented state apparati over the long run. These regimes will therefore have more instability than regimes that employ purely meritocratic standards in their recruitment of new officials.

Finally, an authoritarian regime may employ wholly personalistic standards in their recruitment of new members. Personalistic systems differ from “restricted” systems primarily in the fact that recruitment occurs with little or no regard whatsoever for the technical competence of the candidates. Instead, a personalistic recruitment system emphasizes candidate’s personal connections with officials already associated with the regime. These personal connections are required to enter and advance in such regimes. Personalistic regimes frequently resemble organized crime syndicates where stature is earned through a combination of demonstrated loyalty and outright bribery. Personalistic authoritarian regimes can therefore be expected to provide generally inefficient and poor service compared to meritocratic and restricted recruitment systems due to the nearly nonexistent connection between administrative skill and political employment. Such perversions of the modern bureaucratic state ideal are likely to fail in the long run. Authoritarian regimes premised primarily on such personalistic lines therefore experience the greatest amount of instability and, therefore, regime change.

In the era of modern bureaucratic states, a regime's performance in the provision of services is inextricably linked to its ability to recruit and retain competent officials. To the extent that an authoritarian regime places short-term political dependability over long-term administrative performance, it will ironically do itself more harm than good. Officials chosen by virtue of their personal connections or their capacity to fit politically-defined categories of acceptability will, on average, perform less successfully than those chosen by virtue of their skills. Regimes dominated by unskilled administrators and leaders will, through administrative incompetence, give rise to more occasions where discontent could open the door to public rebellion. The more meritocratic the authoritarian recruitment system the more likely it is to provide solid services – enhancing its chances of survival in the process.

Regime Ideology

Authoritarian leaders generally legitimate their regime by pursuing a set of philosophically defined goals that is amenable to at least some influential portion of their population. The specific objectives of a regime can obviously vary widely. However, I argue that this diverse universe of goals can be usefully categorized in a compelling way to produce a generalizable scheme with implications for an authoritarian regime's stability. The logic behind the political ideology dimension in my study is simple: some regime goals simply produce more motivated enemies than others. Authoritarian regimes that pursue ideologies that alienate a significant segment of their population can be expected to experience more instability. Conversely, regimes that pursue relatively uncontroversial goals will have a much easier time controlling their population. The AIP conceives of authoritarian ideology as being of one of three types: 1) "pragmatic", 2) "economic", and 3) "ethnic".

The most stable authoritarian regimes will pursue some degree of pragmatism in their domestic governance. “Pragmatic” regimes really have but one ideology, either explicitly or implicitly, and that is to maintain their own political power. These regimes generally function on some combination of largesse mixed with the liberal employment of force when necessary. Pragmatic objectives can be identified in non-democratic regimes as diverse as military governments (e.g. Haiti under the military junta), personalistic kleptocracies (e.g. Zaire under Mobutu), and bureaucratic-authoritarian states (e.g. the Argentina described famously by O’Donnell [1973]). Pragmatic governments are generally premised on the idea that their rule is necessary for “stability” and “law and order.” Pragmatic political goals can also be seen in the class of regimes that have been characterized by “competitive authoritarianism” (Levitsky & Way 2002). The comparative durability of a pragmatic authoritarian regime can be attributed to its ability to restrict the number of enemies it will make within its own civil society. An authoritarian regime motivated by the simple goal of retaining power can reasonably expect to co-opt many of its potential adversaries and repress the few it cannot buy off. A pragmatic authoritarian regime will generate very few citizens that feel they have no choice but to resist. More often, such a regime will tempt its subjects with potential gains in exchange for their fealty. Therefore, a pragmatic political program is expected to generate the most stable authoritarian regimes.

Simple pragmatism may be an effective method of political survival, but many authoritarian regimes acquire power in an effort to effect a substantive change in the economic structure of their society. I term this class of authoritarian ideologies as “economic.” Common examples of economic authoritarian ideologies include Marxist socialism (e.g. the Soviet Union) and developmentalist regimes (e.g. Lee Kwan Yew’s Singapore). Unlike pragmatic-style

authoritarian regimes, economic authoritarian regimes assume a transformational role in their state's economy and the distribution of economic benefits within their society. Therefore, an economic authoritarian regime has the potential to generate a substantial subset of alienated societal forces. Depending on the specific nature of its program, an economic authoritarian state could engender opposition from groups such as exploited or neglected agricultural sectors, private businessmen who find their endeavors regulated or curtailed, and workers who find their rights or opportunities constrained. An economic authoritarian regime might find it possible to co-opt and suppress a significantly large portion of this potential opposition, but it will generally create a significant pool of enemies requiring repression. This enemy-generating potential renders an economic authoritarian regime more unstable than a simple pragmatic one.

“Ethnic domination” is the most de-stabilizing form of ideological goal an authoritarian regime can pursue. While I accept the tremendous mobilizational potential of ethnic identities, a finding derived from the extensive literature on ethnicity, identity, politics and conflict (e.g. Horowitz 1985; Saideman 2000; Laitin 2000), I also contend it is a source of tremendous potential instability. By ethnic ideology, I refer not to *all* forms of nationalism, but those Smith (1991) referred to as “ethnic-genealogical” rather than the milder “civic-territorial” variant of American and Western European tradition (authoritarian regimes which practice the latter can generally be classified as either pragmatic or economic). Ethnic nationalist programs, by their very nature, tend to generate ingroup-outgroup dynamics that emphasize the virtuous nature of the group holding power. Indeed, the superiority of a particular ethnic group, as opposed to its potential competitors, is frequently the justification for having an ethnic authoritarian regime in the first place. Without its authoritarian state, the ruling ethnic group is depicted as subject to exploitation and possible destruction. Such chauvinistic programs are especially dangerous in

substantially multiethnic societies. When a substantial portion of the populace does not fit into the dominant ethnic category, it creates a potentially large pool of highly motivated enemies. Ethnicity is a highly inflexible standard of classification that categorizes citizens into rigidly defined groups. Citizens that are not members of the ruling ethnicity therefore find themselves subject to a regime premised on their inferiority and subjugation with little hope of an improvement in status or condition. Ethnic nationalism also threatens to generate opposition within the very group it seeks to empower: members of the ruling ethnic group will sometimes turn against the brutal practices of authoritarian regimes acting in their name. An ethnic nationalist regime is therefore expected to be the most destabilizing form of authoritarian ideology.

In summary, the dimension I term regime ideology categorizes authoritarian regimes into three philosophical groupings on an ordinal scale implying greater stability for regimes likely to generate the fewest motivated enemies. Pragmatic regimes, by their very nature unambitious, are likely to alienate comparatively little of their citizenry and will likely be able to use an extensive mixture of carrots and sticks to co-opt potential adversaries. Economic regimes, which create substantial groups of disaffected and disadvantaged “losers,” will experience comparatively more instability. Ethnic regimes, which actively promote the interests of an inflexibly defined sector of society, generate highly motivated enemies amongst citizens that do not fit into the ruling group. The life-or-death tension present in many ethnic regimes leads to their classification as the type of authoritarianism most likely to generate dedicated opposition. Therefore, such regimes are expected to experience the greatest degree of instability.

Autonomy of the Military

Any authoritarian regime, which is inherently an endeavor to limit access to positions of political power, ultimately rests on its ability to use force to ensure its continued survival. This is not to say that an authoritarian regime will openly employ the instruments of force on its population constantly or even very frequently. However, when push comes to shove, an authoritarian regime's stability depends on its ability to suppress domestic challenges to its rule. Suppressive force-wielding organizations, namely the military, are therefore a vital component of any authoritarian regime. With this dimension, the AIP attempts to account for the relationship between military elites and political elites within authoritarian states.

The need to employ physical force is a Damoclean sword for any authoritarian regime. While their power ultimately rests on the political use of force, the organizations that actually provide this service themselves become a threat to the regime. Normally, an authoritarian regime will be primarily concerned with the loyalty of their militaries – generally speaking the most powerful instrument of force at their disposal. A common theoretical assumption found in existing scholarship contends that the regime will have depoliticized the military to the point where the military's interests will be, functionally, in alignment with the political movement in power (e.g. Brooker 2000). I argue that this relationship is, in fact, an empirical question. Perlmutter and LeoGrande's (1982) somewhat overlooked study on the relationship between militaries and Communist one-party political regimes provides a compelling framework for understanding the different forms of relationship a military elite may have with its political counterpart. They argue that these two elites are not, in all cases, indistinguishable from one another. This is especially true in older authoritarian regimes as "first generation" military and political elites are succeeded by more specifically-trained specialists. Borrowing conceptually

from Perlmutter and LeoGrande (1982), the AIP conceives of the military-government elite relationship, in descending order of intimacy, as being one of 1) “fusion,” 2) “symbiosis,” and 3) “coalition.” The more independent military elites are from their political counterpart, the more likely they are to act along their own, rather than regime, interests. An autonomous military therefore serves as a significant potential source of authoritarian instability.

Authoritarian regimes where the military and political elites are indistinguishable from one another are considered “fused.” In these cases, leaders exist as a “dual elite” serving both political and military functions. Perlmutter and LeoGrande (1982) cite the Cuban regime of Fidel Castro as an example of such an arrangement. One could also consider pure military regimes, where the military itself acts as an institution of government, as another comparable case of elite fusion. In cases where the two elites are virtually inseparable, the military can be said to possess very little autonomy. If a military elite is fused with its corresponding political elite, it will have little if any leeway to chart a possible coup or violent seizure of power (indeed, it may already in fact *be* in power). In such cases, the authoritarian regime will be comparatively stable.

A “symbiotic” relationship is a situation where the military and political elites are interdependent for each other’s survival, but remain identifiably separate. In such cases the military elite exists as an independent actor, but depends substantially on its political counterpart for continued power. Perlmutter and LeoGrande’s (1982) example of the People’s Liberation Army in the People’s Republic of China provides an excellent example. While separate military and political elites have emerged in China, the regime depends on the military for political protection while the military depends on the ideological legitimation provided by its service to the party’s communist program. In short, a symbiotic relationship obtains where a military elite might itself lose its privileged position if its political partners were to fall. In such cases, the

regime will not be as stable as it would be if the two elites were fused, given the military's ability to act independently of its political counterparts, but the risks inherent in an open break between the two are substantial enough that both parties will have an incentive to minimize any internal conflicts.

Finally, a "coalitional" relationship between a regime and its military is the weakest and most unstable possibility on this dimension of the AIP. In a coalitional relationship, the military elite is identifiably separate from the political elite in much the same way as it is in the symbiotic relationship. However, in a coalitional arrangement, military and political elites co-exist because of the mutual gains (material, influential and otherwise) enjoyed by their doing so. Here, military elites are not dependent in the same way on the political elite but the military does derive substantial benefit from this relationship – benefits that encourage continued cooperation. The weakness of this relationship becomes evident in cases where this stream of benefits may become interrupted or discontinued indefinitely by wars, economic downturns, and other unforeseen misfortunes. In these situations, military may have an incentive to either overthrow its political counterpart itself or acquiesce to another societal actor seizing power in its place. As a result, the weak bonds found in the coalitional political-military elite relationship serve as a font of instability.

Independent militaries are the bane of stable authoritarian regimes. The role played by the instruments of coercive force in an authoritarian regime gives the military disproportionate importance in politics. A military elite's capability of acting in its own interests, and acting contrary to the interests of its political counterpart, is therefore an important factor in determining regime stability. A military that is functionally fused with its political counterparts is incapable of acting contrary to the regime: it *is*, in effect, the regime. Military elites that depend

substantially on their political counterparts for continued survival, but remain identifiably separate from these political elites, will result in authoritarian regimes that are less stable. Finally, a military that engages with a political regime in an alliance of convenience forges very weak bonds that may become sundered at the first sign of friction or trouble.

Civil Society Domination

The extent to which an authoritarian regime dominates its civil society serves as the final dimension of authoritarian instability I intend to investigate via the AIP. An authoritarian regime that has thoroughly penetrated and dominated its society will limit the ability of its citizens to effectively organize against the regime. This particular element of my framework focuses upon a society's capacity to mobilize itself independently of its authoritarian political leadership. This ability to independently organize is a permissive condition conducive to the formation of movements that might overthrow the regime. Therefore, authoritarian regimes that dominate their society's ability to organize will be more stable. An authoritarian regime may dominate its civil society in one of three ways: 1) "exclusively", 2) "partially" or 3) "through demobilization."

Authoritarian regimes able to thoroughly dominate their society to the exclusion of all others are expected to be the most stable. In an "exclusive" authoritarian regime, the government organizationally supervises virtually every form of collective public activity. My conceptualization of exclusive authoritarian regimes closely parallels the relationship between state and society in Linz's (2000) definition of totalitarianism. An exclusive authoritarian regime will ban, or virtually ban, all but one political party and will place a large number of barriers on the ability of its citizens to participate in alternative political organizations. In such situations, the authoritarian state in effect becomes the medium for all political activity throughout its society.

While citizens that live under such a regime will not find it completely impossible to organize themselves independently, the necessity of doing so in secrecy and haunted by the fear of betrayal will limit the likely size, scope, and capability of such movements. Also, since civil society retains a basic capability of political action in exclusive authoritarian regimes, it will have an incentive to work within the regime's framework rather than endure the potentially heavy costs needed to change it. Therefore, authoritarian regimes able to achieve the difficult task of establishing exclusive control of political activity within their state will face little coherent opposition.

Frequently, even authoritarian regimes with a significant presence in their civil society will find it difficult to completely control politics. In these "partially-dominant" regimes, the governing movement will exist in parallel with several political organizations that do not hold, and have little realistic hope of holding, substantive political power. The relatively handicapped opposition movements found in competitive authoritarian regimes (Levitsky and Way 2002) would fit such a definition. Even more traditional one-party states – such as Falangist Spain or Fascist Italy – can be found that have not been able to completely dominate their civil society to the exclusion of all others (Gunther 1980). Such partially-dominant authoritarian regimes still retain many of the advantages found in exclusive arrangements. In a partially-dominant regime, the governing movement's preeminence, while not always loved, is never doubted. This preferential position in society acts as a disincentive for citizens to join or actively participate in tolerated but effectively neutered alternative political organizations. However, these organizations still present a long-term danger to the regime's stability. While they may be largely ineffectual under normal circumstances, crises or other sudden emergencies may suddenly see these non-regime institutions become the organizational cores of a potent and active opposition.

Partially-dominant authoritarian regimes therefore exist in an environment where their rule could be subject to sudden challenges. This organizational potential makes partially-dominant regimes more unstable than their exclusively dominant compatriots.

Finally, authoritarian regimes that seek to politically “demobilize” their population completely will face the greatest degree of instability. In these cases, the regime generally does not have a sufficient political infrastructure to engage and mobilize their subject population. As a result, they seek to deny their citizens any substantial political voice through a competitor. This strategy is, in effect, an attempt to level the political playing field: since the regime lacks the ability to mobilize the people in favor of their political objectives, they will make every effort to ensure that any potential opposition will not be able to do so either. The result is a civil society that has been officially stripped of political organizations. In the short term, this serves the regime’s interest in maintaining its control over their subject society. However, in the long term, this will present the regime with difficulties in controlling its population (Lai and Slater 2006). When a population has no outlet for legitimate political activity, they will naturally seek to organize on an unofficial basis. The end result is that politics gets pushed underground. The regime then loses the ability to co-opt or channel the political activity of its people whatsoever. As a result, these authoritarian regimes are left with few options other than naked repression to keep their population under control, which only reinforces resistance to the government. Therefore, given the regime’s relative lack of political levers other than violence, demobilizing authoritarian regimes will be the least stable on this dimension.

To review, the ability to manipulate civil society is an important indicator of the likely stability of a given authoritarian regime. An exclusive arrangement where the regime acts as the sole medium of legitimate political expression will experience the most stability. This system

gives the citizenry an outlet for political activity and creates practical and legal obstacles for the emergence of domestic alternatives. A partially-dominated society will also be able to express their political interests through the official party or one of the officially tolerated alternatives, but will have an incentive to work with the regime under normal conditions due to its preeminent status. However, these situations are more unstable because of the latent oppositional potential these alternative organizations represent. Finally, regimes that seek to strip society of political organizations altogether in an effort to make it more quiescent will only make their own position more untenable in the long term. Therefore, these situations will present authoritarian regimes with the most instability.

Summary of the Conceptual Foundations of the AIP

In this section, I have briefly described each of the five dimensions of authoritarian instability I intend to catalogue with the AIP. The various dimensions outlined here will advance the understanding of which factors, and combinations of factors, influence the propensity of authoritarian regimes to fall thereby influencing behavior. A regime that has experienced several leadership turnovers, maintains a meritocratic system of political recruitment, espouses a pragmatic ideology, rules in close partnership with the military, and dominates political participation of society is expected to be the most stable form of authoritarian regime. Conversely, a comparatively new, personalistic, ethnically divisive regime with an autonomous military and a politically de-mobilized society is expected to be the most unstable variant of authoritarian regime. As stated at the outset of this section, authoritarian regimes are expected to vary independently along each dimension. This implies a diverse array of possible combinations.

For the purposes of clarity, the five dimensions I have described here and the three possible ordinal values of each dimension are recapitulated in Table 1:

TABLE 1 – Potential values on the five dimensions of Authoritarian Instability

<u>Dimension</u>	<i>Greater Stability</i>	—————▶	<i>Greater Instability</i>
Regime Tenure	Two or more Turnovers in Leadership	One Turnover in Leadership	No Turnovers in Leadership
Openness of Political Recruitment	Meritocratic	Restricted	Personalistic
Regime Ideology	Pragmatic	Economic	Ethnic
Autonomy of the Military	Fusion	Symbiosis	Coalition
Civil Society Domination	Exclusive	Partial	Demobilized

The AIP Indexes: The Structure of the Data

In keeping with the precedent established by quantitative regime datasets such as Polity, I intend to catalogue my data using country-years as the unit of analysis. I will restrict my data to authoritarian regimes only. Authoritarian regimes will be identified through use of the Polity data. As such, the AIP is envisioned as an empirical counterpart and complement to Polity. In Polity, regimes that exhibit a consolidated score of +6 or greater are classified as “strong democracies” (Jagers and Gurr 1995). I will, in my data, include all regimes not classified as “strong democracies” (i.e. all regimes coded as +5 or less). These regimes will be coded on each of my three dimensions of authoritarian instability for each year they are considered to be not strong democracies by Polity. In situations where a regime exhibits multiple values on any of my AIP instability dimensions during a given year, I will code the value as it stands on December 31st of the year in question (again, following the procedural expedient established by Polity). Each country-year entry will contain seven data entries: the raw dimensional coding for each of the five AIP dimensions, a consolidated AIP Instability Score, and an experimental interactive AIP Instability Index.

The first group of variables, the ordinal dimensional indicators, will provide other political analysts with the greatest degree of flexibility in the use of my data. The coding of these indicators will be determined through qualitative research into each case. As such, this is expected to be the most time-consuming and labor-intensive portion of the project. I intend to use multiple researchers to achieve an acceptable degree of inter-coder reliability. While my dataset has been conceived with an explicit conceptual scheme in mind, it is possible that other researchers may not have the same need for my indexes and scores. The AIP would therefore

follow the practice established by Polity of preserving the specific attributes of each regime that are later compiled into composite regime scores. This will allow for my data to serve a large variety of research needs. For example, my data might serve as a pool of potential cases for research on authoritarian regimes that co-exist with a highly autonomous military. In any event, it will also allow for follow-on research to manipulate my dimensions in alternative as yet unforeseen ways. My qualitative empirical work can then still provide some benefit for those who disagree with the logic behind my theoretical foundations. The AIP will therefore have a variable entry corresponding with each of the five dimensions of authoritarian instability (as seen on Table 1). Each dimension will be coded trinomially with a “0,” “1,” or “2.” Using this technique, comparatively stable authoritarian conditions will be represented by smaller numbers (0) and comparatively unstable conditions are represented by larger ones (2). For instance, on the Regime Ideology dimension, a pragmatic regime coding will be represented by a “0” whereas an ethnic regime coding will be represented by a “2.”

The sixth data entry will provide a consolidated regime indicator drawn from the dimensional data on each regime country-year. The central focus of the AIP is the identification of authoritarian regimes that, on the whole, can be considered more unstable than others. While I identify the sources of instability on five separate dimensions, they are considered to be different facets of this overall stability condition. With this in mind, the consolidated AIP Instability Score will be calculated simply by adding together the values of the five dimensional indicators. The theoretical foundation behind this measure is that higher values on multiple AIP dimensions will combine in an additive fashion to affect an authoritarian regime’s overall stability. The end-result will be a central AIP Instability Score ranging from 0 (most stable) to 10 (least stable).

Obviously, this approach is an adaptation of the simplifying regime-score device employed by the Polity project.

The seventh and final variable entry serves as an experimental measure of the possible multiplicative effect of scoring highly on several dimensions of the AIP simultaneously. While the theoretical underpinning of the AIP Instability Score embraces the assumption that high scores on multiple dimensions will have an additive effect on a regime's instability (a practice in line with the Polity precedent), the AIP Instability Index explores the possibility that there might in fact be an interaction effect between the different dimensions. In short, various factors that promote a regime's instability could potentially, when present simultaneously, magnify the effects of others. To explore this possibility, the AIP Instability Index will be calculated by multiplying each of the dimensional values together (after adding "1" to each to avoid the mathematical result of multiplying "0"s). The result will be an index varying from 1 (most stable) to 243 (most unstable).

The final AIP will therefore contain an entry for each authoritarian country-year consisting of seven variables. In the interests of clarity, these variables, their possible values, and their origins are re-capitulated in Table 2:

TABLE 2 – Component Variables of the AIP

<u>#</u>	<u>Variable</u>	<u>Value Range</u>	<u>How Variable Is Coded</u>
<i>Dimensional Attributes</i>			
1	Regime Tenure	0-2 (Integer)	Qualitative Research of Case
2	Openness of Political Recruitment	0-2 (Integer)	Qualitative Research of Case
3	Regime Ideology	0-2 (Integer)	Qualitative Research of Case
4	Autonomy of the Military	0-2 (Integer)	Qualitative Research of Case
5	Civil Society Domination	0-2 (Integer)	Qualitative Research of Case
<i>Consolidated Instability Measures</i>			
6	AIP Instability Score (Additive)	0-10 (Integer)	Var1 + Var2 + Var3 + Var4 + Var5
7	AIP Instability Index (Interactive)	1-243 (Integer)	(Var1 + 1) * (Var2 + 1) * (Var3 + 1) * (Var4 + 1) * (Var5 + 1)

Conclusion: The Potential of the AIP

The primary motivation behind the AIP is to embark upon a refined examination of how different types of authoritarian regime will behave in the arena of international conflict. With the contention that unstable regimes are dangerous members of the international system as its point of departure, the AIP seeks to probe deeper into the potential sources of instability in authoritarian regimes than any previous quantitative empirical effort. The initial contribution of the AIP will therefore be provided in the study of international conflict. However, a refined body of data on authoritarian instability holds the potential to advance other research programs as well. The study of democratization is one area that might benefit from this new pool of empirics. The study of economic reform and transitions is another. Research into ethnic conflict might find the AIP useful in discovering regimes that would be prone to genocide and other humanitarian crimes and disasters. Theories on the nature of repression in authoritarian societies might find additional empirical traction through the use of the AIP. In short, the proposed dataset I hope to assemble could potentially serve a huge array of research agendas. It is the very novelty and versatility of the AIP that is, I believe, its greatest asset and the most compelling argument for its genesis.

While the AIP will primarily seek to provide a large pool of empirical data to discover generalizable trends in the past behavior of various types of authoritarian regime, the end result will hopefully also assist in the formulation of more accurate predictive models. The analyses that would flow from the employment of this data would not only benefit the scholarly pursuit of theoretical questions, but could potentially lead to sounder policy. With much of the world focused on the behavior of authoritarian regimes from the Far East to Sub-Saharan Africa, the

relevance of such an advance is manifest. The AIP could provide insight into which policy options are most likely to succeed when dealing with a particular authoritarian regime, and which are most likely to fail. For instance, a stable authoritarian regime would be an excellent candidate for engagement: it is likely to survive for a substantial amount of time and not be easily overthrown. An unstable authoritarian regime, on the other hand, might be a case where confrontation could yield a beneficial change of regime (or a malignant change of regime as the case may be). In short, the actual practice of international relations stands to benefit from the AIP as much as the academic study of the subject.

To conclude where I began, it is not yet possible to make a definitive determination as to whether a potential Shia or Sunni successor authoritarian regime in Iraq would be more peaceful than the Ba'athists they would be functionally replacing. Until the AIP is completed, this question cannot be answered with any degree of empirical certainty. If my expectations hold up, however, it might be the United States has destroyed one devil only to see it replaced with one that is much worse. A renewed authoritarian Iraq would not only face the instability of all first-generation regimes but it would also likely be dominated by sectarian ethnic conflict and, potentially, an ethnic ideological program. Disturbing trends in contemporary Iraqi politics – such as the Mahdi Army, lead by the firebrand Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr – raise the possibility that personalistic political organizations would take to the fore in such a regime. The potentially autonomous military elite being constructed as a part of American occupation efforts would also present complications to such a regime. Finally, this new Iraqi regime would likely be able to impose, at best, only partial domination over its civil society. In a worst case scenario, it might preside over a society without any substantial mobilizing organizations at all. In sum, it may become close to what the AIP would categorize as the most unstable type of authoritarian regime

imaginable. Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist party, while violent and largely unpredictable, at least dominated Iraqi civil society to the official exclusion of all others – an achievement not likely to be quickly matched by a successor authoritarian regime. This unsavory outcome may yet be averted via the establishment of a semi-stable democracy in Iraq. The chances of doing so seem small enough, however, that the American incursion into Iraq now looks like a potentially disastrous gamble. A more complete understanding of the detail in the devils might have made the nature of this gamble clearer when it was initially taken. While it still may have been a risk worth taking, policy would undoubtedly have been well served by a clearer picture of those risks.

Bibliography

Brooker, P. (2000) *Non-Democratic Regimes: Theory, Government, and Politics*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Bueno de Mesquita, B., J. D. Morrow, R. M. Siverson, and A. Smith (2003) *The Logic of Political Survival*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Danilovic, V. and J. Clare (2004) "Authoritarian Regimes and International Conflict." Presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association Montreal, Canada.

Dixon, W. (1994) Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict. *American Political Science Review* **88**: 14.

Downs, Anthony (1957). *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York, NY: Harper.

Elman, M.F. (2000) Unpacking Democracy: Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Theories of Democratic Peace. *Security Studies* **9**: 91.

Fukai, S. and H. Fukai (1992) Elite Recruitment and Political Leadership. *PS: Political Science and Politics*. **25**: 25-36.

Geddes, B. (1999) What Do We Know about Democratization after Twenty Years? *Annual Review of Political Science* **2**: 115.

Gunther, R. (1980). *Public Policy in a No-Party State*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Horowitz, D. L. (1985) *Ethnic groups in conflict*. Berkeley : University of California Press.

Huntington, S. P. (1993) *The Third Wave*. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press.

————— (1968) *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.

Jaggars, K. and T. R. Gurr (1995) Tracking Democracy's Third Wave with the Polity III Data. *The Journal of Peace Research* **32**: 469.

Karl, T. & P. Schmitter (1991) What Democracy Is... And Is Not. *Journal of Democracy* **2**: 75-89.

Laakso, M. and R. Taagepara (1979) Effective Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe. *Comparative Political Studies* **12**: 3.

Lai, B. and D. Slater (2006) Institutions on the Offensive: Domestic Sources of Dispute Initiation in Authoritarian Regimes, 1950-1992. *American Journal of Political Science* **50**: 113.

Laitin, D. (2000) Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity, *International Organization* **54**: 845.

Levitsky, S and LA Way (2002) The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism. *Journal of Democracy* **13**: 51.

Linz, J. (2000) *Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes*. Boulder, Colo. : Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Mansfield, E. D. and J. Snyder (2002) Incomplete Democratization and the Outbreak of Military Disputes. *International Studies Quarterly* **46**: 529.

Maoz, Z. and B. Russett (1993) Normative and Structural Causes of the Democratic Peace, 1946-1986. *American Political Science Review* **87**: 624.

Miller, R. A. (1995) Democratic Structures and the Diversionary Use of Force. *American Journal of Political Science* **39**: 760.

Morgan, T. C. and S. H. Campbell (1991) Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints, and War. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* **35**: 187.

Mousseau, M. (1998) Democracy and Compromise in Militarized Interstate Conflicts, 1816-1992. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* **42**:210.

- O'Donnell, G. (1973) *Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism*. Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies.
- Oneal, J. and B. Russett (1999) The Kantian Peace. *World Politics* **52**: 1.
- Peceny, M., and C. C. Beer, with S. Sanchez-Terry (2002) Dictatorial Peace? *American Political Science Review* **96**: 15.
- Perlmutter A. and W. LeoGrande (1982) The Party in Uniform. *American Political Science Review* **76**: 778-789.
- Raymond, G. A. (1994) Democracies, Disputes, and third-Party Intermediaries. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* **38**: 259.
- Reiter, D. and E. Tillman (2002) Public, Legislative, and Executive Constraints on the Democratic Initiation of Conflict. *Journal of Politics* **64**: 810.
- Russett, B. and J. Oneal (2001) *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations*. New York: Norton.
- Saideman, S. (2000) *The Ties That Divide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign & International Conflict*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Smith, A. (1991) *National Identity*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Snyder, J. (2000) *From Voting to Violence Democratization and Nationalist Conflict*. New York: Norton.
- Stepan, A. C. (1988) *Rethinking military politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone*. Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press.