Autumn Lockwood Payton

Dissertation Overview

Tying Down Gulliver: How Weak States Control the Design of International Institutions

Every institution creates winners and losers. Thus, when states form international organizations the form that these institutions assume can have important distributional consequences for potential members. When states gathered in Rome to negotiate the design of the International Criminal Court they were confronted with no shortage of obstacles that imperiled the fate of the organization. The central debates over the design of the court pitted major powers against some of the weakest states in the international system. This dissertation demonstrates that, contrary to prevailing explanations, weak states can exert control over the design of international institutions. Through logrolling and issue-linkage, weak states can strategically design institutions that benefit them and convince other actors, including major powers to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of an international organization, such as the ICC, when the institution did not directly reflect their own interests. I test this argument both quantitatively on an original data set and trace the bargaining process states engaged in over ICC negotiations.

Dissertation Committee

Working Papers

• "(pH)alse Promises: BIAs as a Litmus Test for the Strength of International Commitments" with Irfan Nooruddin. Currently under review. Paper presented for the Annual Meeting if the International Studies Association, San Francisco, Calif. March 26-29, 2008.

 

• "Voting Rules in International Organizations: Reflections of Power or Facilitators of Cooperation?" with Daniel J. Blake. Paper presented for the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, San Francisco, Calif. March 26-29, 2008.
   
• "Racing to the Bottom? The Political Economy of Human Rights Protection" with Byungwon Woo. Paper presented for the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Ill. April 2-5, 2009.